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ABSTRACT
We present the results of a questionnaire study with Belgian undergraduate
students as respondents. We consider the relationship between people’s
direct ethical preferences, their preferences behind a veil of ignorance, and
theirpurelyindividualriskpreferencesoverincomedistributions.Theresults
reveal that, although there are important similarities between the three
types of preferences, the ﬁrst and third types form two extremes, while the
second type lies in between the other two. Consistency of response patterns
with the expected utility (EU) and rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU)
models – natural analogues of the social welfare functions most frequently
used in the literature on inequality and social welfare – is tested as well.
For all three types of preferences the results reveal that, in the considered
context, the RDEU model does not add explanatory power to the EU model.
However, preferences appear to be relatively well described by some of the
basic concepts from non-expected utility theory not usually considered in the
income distribution literature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The central problem of distributive justice is ﬁnding an ethical ranking of income
distributions.Itisgenerallyacceptedthatsuchanethicalrankingshouldreﬂectina
certainsensethepreferencesofanimpartialandsympatheticobserver(henceforth
referred to as “ISO preferences”) – “...a person taking a positive sympathetic
interest in the welfare of each participant but having no partial bias in favor of
any participant” (Harsanyi, 1977, p. 49). ISO preferences have been analysed in
the literature in many different ways, but a particularly inﬂuential approach has
been the exploration of the formal links between inequality and risk (Cowell &
Schokkaert, 2001). This link has been put forward in its most explicit form in
Harsanyi’s (1953, 1955) approach of the veil of ignorance.1
Harsanyirephrasestheproblemofdistributivejusticeasaproblemofindividual
decision making under risk: income distributions should be ranked according to
the preferences of a rational individual behind the veil of ignorance (henceforth,
“VOIpreferences”).VOIpreferencesarethepreferencesoverincomedistributions
of a rational individual who does not know her own position in each income
distribution (nor the position of the other members of society) and has (like these
other members), for each income distribution, an equal probability of ending up
with the income of any of the members of society. Harsanyi argues that rationality
requires that VOI preferences be consistent with expected utility (EU) theory. By
consequence, the social welfare function, which represents ethical preferences,
inherits the formal properties of the EU model and is of the mean utilitarian type.2
This approach is often seen as providing a justiﬁcation for the most frequently
used social welfare function in the income distribution literature, which is of the
mean utilitarian form with utility a function exclusively of own income and an
identical utility function for each individual.3 However, this approach raises two
sets of questions.
First,itisnotobviousthatVOIpreferencesandISOpreferencesindeedcoincide.
The idea of the veil of ignorance is only one among many proposed approaches to
the problem of ﬁnding an ethical ranking of income distributions. Moreover, the
assumption that utility is a function exclusively of own income does not follow
directly from Harsanyi’s conditions. Indeed, VOI preferences are preferences over
lotteries that have complete income distributions as outcomes, not preferences
over lotteries with individual incomes as outcomes. We refer to the latter type of
preferences as purely individual risk preferences (henceforth, “PIR preferences”).
The assumption that utility is a function exclusively of own income can be
justiﬁed if VOI preferences are identical to PIR preferences. Differences between
VOI preferences and PIR preferences can result from the fact that the individuals
do not care only about their own incomes, but also for instance about overallSocial Welfare, the Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 87
equality or about their own relative income position. A comparison of ISO and
VOI preferences with PIR preferences therefore could give some insight into the
importance of externalities. What is the exact relationship between ISO, VOI and
PIR preferences?
Second, the risk literature has provided ample empirical evidence of systematic
violations of EU theory (the Allais paradox being the most famous example).
A theoretical literature on non-expected utility (non-EU) models has developed
mainly to accommodate these empirical violations.4 It seems interesting to check
whether these violations of EU theory for PIR preferences are also relevant for
the ethical ranking of income distributions, that is, for ISO and VOI preferences.
In fact, one of the most popular concepts from the non-EU literature, i.e.
rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU), has in its simpliﬁed form (Yaari, 1987)
received considerable attention in the income distribution literature because it
provides a normative basis for an important subclass of the class of generalized
Giniinequalityindices.5 Recentcontributionshaveexploredfurtherlinksbetween
the RDEU model in its general form and the measurement of inequality (Gajdos,
2001). How attractive are these non-EU approaches from an ethical point of view?
The present paper examines both issues through a questionnaire approach with
Belgian students. We want to check whether their intuitions coincide with the
formal approaches used by economists. In order to beneﬁt from the accumulated
knowledge in the risk literature, the set-up of our questionnaire will be analogous
to the conventional approach used in that literature. We put respondents into three
different choice contexts allowing revelation of ISO, VOI and PIR preferences,
respectively. In each of these cases we test whether we discover any violations
of the standard properties of the EU model. Such violations can also raise doubts
about some of the standard assumptions in the literature on income distribution.
Moreover, we will also check the empirical relevancy of the Yaari and RDEU
models as well as that of some more basic non-EU concepts.
The questionnaire approach has recently become more popular in the economic
literature on distributive justice. It has been used extensively for testing the
acceptance of the crucial axioms from the literature on income distribution.6
Recent work has explicitly compared the acceptability of these axioms for the
income inequality and the risk setting (Amiel & Cowell, 2002; Amiel, Cowell &
Polovin, 2001). Traub, Seidl and Schmidt (2003) and Camacho-Cuena, Seidl and
Morone (2003) have run experiments in which subjects get material incentives to
rankeitherincomedistributionsorriskyprospects.Thecloserelationshipbetween
social welfare judgements and choice under risk and the theoretical suppositions
of  the  EU  approach  are  far  from  evident  for  large  groups  of  respondents.  Closest
related to our work is a questionnaire study by Bernasconi (2002). He also checks
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of our questions is very different, however, and we go further in testing explicitly
some non-EU alternatives. Despite these differences, some of our results turn out
to be similar to those of Bernasconi.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of relevant
ﬁndings from EU theory and non-EU theory and links these to the evaluation of
income distributions. The actual questionnaire study is presented in Section 3.I n
Section 4, we present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. (NON-)EXPECTED UTILITY
THEORY AND THE EVALUATION
OF INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS
We ﬁrst consider EU theory (Section 2.1) and some basic concepts from non-EU
theory (Section 2.2). In Section 2.3, we summarize the basic characteristics of
the RDEU model and of Yaari’s theory. Finally, in Section 2.4, we return to the
evaluation of income distributions.
We use the following notation. The set of incomes is X ={ x1,x2,...,xn},
where the incomes are indexed such that x1 ≤···≤xn. An income distribution
is a vector p = (p1,...,pn) with pi ∈ [0,1] for all i and
n
i=1 pi = 1, where
pi is the proportion of the population with income xi. In the case of individual
decision under risk, income distributions have to be interpreted as lotteries, where
pi is the probability of outcome xi. Preferences over alternatives, either income
distributions or lotteries, are captured by a binary relation   (“is at least as good
as”). The relation has an asymmetric factor   (“is better than”), and a symmetric




A convenient representation to compare the implications of EU theory with
the implications of various non-EU theories is the so-called Marschak-Machina
triangle7 (see Fig. 1). Focusing on lotteries with only three possible outcomes (or
incomedistributionswithonlythreeincomelevels)x1 < x2 < x3,eachalternative
can be written as a pair (p1,p3), with p2 determined implicitly as p2 = 1 − p1 −
p3.Since,furthermore,fori = 1,2,3,itholdsthatpi ∈ [0,1],allthesealternatives
arepointsinthetriangle{(p1,p3) ∈ R2
+ |p1 + p3 ≤ 1}.IntheMarschak-Machina
triangle of Fig. 1, the different points represent thirteen possible alternatives. Our
questionnaire study will focus on eight pairwise choices: each choice problem,
j = 1,...,8, involves a choice among a pair of alternative lotteries or income
distributions (aj,bj). Note that the dotted lines connecting each of these pairs ofSocial Welfare, the Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 89
Fig. 1. EU Indifference Curves in the Marschak-Machina Triangle.
alternatives have the same slope equal to four. The probabilities corresponding to
the speciﬁc options represented in Fig. 1 are shown in Table 1.
2.1. Expected Utility Theory
Letusﬁrstsummarizeinaloosewaythebasicideaofexpectedutility(EU)theory.
Suppose that all the alternatives can be ordered (implying that the preference
relation is reﬂexive, transitive and complete) and that this ordering is continuous
and monotonic. Suppose moreover that the following condition holds:
Table 1. The Choice Pairs (p1, p2, p3).
Question ab
1 (0, 1, 0) (0.05, 0.75, 0.2)
2 (0, 1, 0) (0.2, 0, 0.8)
3 (0.75, 0.25, 0) (0.8, 0, 0.2)
4 (0, 0.25, 0.75) (0.05, 0, 0.95)
5 (0, 0.8, 0.2) (0.05, 0.55, 0.4)
6 (0.2, 0.8, 0) (0.25, 0.55, 0.2)
7 (0, 0.8, 0.2) (0.16, 0, 0.84)
8 (0.2, 0.8, 0) (0.36, 0, 0.64)90 KRISTOF BOSMANS AND ERIK SCHOKKAERT
Independence. Foranyalternativesp,qandrandanyscalar ∈ (0,1),itholds
that p   q if and only if p + (1 − )r   q + (1 − )r.






which means that (ﬁrst order) stochastically dominating alternatives are preferred.
Strong risk aversion, implying that mean preserving spreads are disapproved,
requires that u be strictly concave.
Expression (1) has very strong implications for alternatives in the triangle













which is constant (since the incomes x1,x2 and x3 are given for all points in the
triangle) and positive (since under monotonicity u(x3) > u(x2) > u(x1)).
Positivity of the slope of indifference curves is a general property of preference
theories that respect monotonicity. Note that monotonicity also implies that indif-
ference curves lying more to the northwest correspond to higher preference. For
any point p in the triangle, the set of points strictly to the northwest of p (that is,
all points q such that q1 ≤ p1 and q3 ≥ p3, with at least one of the inequalities
strict) constitutes the set of points strictly stochastically dominating p.




the preferences over the entire triangle diagram. The ﬁgure shows that this feature
severely restricts the number of response patterns allowed. In fact, EU theory
implies that respondents choose consistently eitheraorbor are indifferent in each
of the eight choice pairs. With the indifference curves drawn in the ﬁgure, this
choice should be b. With a larger value for the slope it could be indifference or a.
Note that in EU theory the slope can be seen as a kind of measure for the degree
of risk aversion – in a choice between a certain lottery and a risky one, such as
in pairs 1 and 2 in the ﬁgure, the certain one is chosen only for sufﬁciently high
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2.2. Some Basic Concepts from Non-Expected Utility Theory
The well-known problems discovered by Allais (1953) offer an important chal-
lenge to the restrictive implications of EU theory. The ﬁrst three choice pairs in
Fig.1areselectedsoastoillustratetheseproblems.Allais’“commonconsequence
effect” (also known as the Allais paradox) suggests a tendency for choosing a in
choice pair 1 and b in choice pair 3, thus violating EU theory. Allais’ “common
ratio effect” concerns a tendency for choosing a and b, respectively, in choice
pairs such as 2 and 3, again violating EU theory. There is by now overwhelming
experimental evidence for the empirical relevancy of both predictions (Camerer,
1995; Starmer, 2000).
Onesolutionfor“explaining”theAllaisproblemsisdroppingtheassumptionof
parallel indifference curves. In fact, Machina (1982) introduced for that purpose
the notion of fanning-out. In its pure form, fanning-out represents a monotonic
increase in the slope of indifference curves as one moves northwest in the triangle
(Fig.2).Morespeciﬁcally,itsaysthat,givenanytwopointspandqinthetriangle,
such that q lies to the northwest of p (that is, q stochastically dominates p), the
slope in point q has to be at least as high as that in p. For the choice pairs in the
ﬁgures, fanning-out has the following implications: given any two choice pairs k
and l,i fal stochastically dominates ak and bl stochastically dominates bk, then
the choice of alternative a from pair k implies that alternative a has to be chosen
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from pair l as well, indifference in pair k implies that either alternative a has to be
chosen from pair l or that one has to be indifferent between the alternatives of l.
Fanning-out therefore accounts for the dominant behaviour in situations such as
those suggested by Allais.
Empirical research, however, sometimes reveals the opposite pattern: that of
fanning-in (see, e.g. Battalio, Kagel & Jiranyakul, 1990). In that case, the slope of
the indifference curves becomes smaller as one moves to stochastically dominat-
ing alternatives. For the choice pairs in the ﬁgures, fanning-in has the following
implications: given any two choice pairs k and l,i fal stochastically dominates ak
and bl stochastically dominates bk, then the choice of alternative b in k implies
that alternative b has to be chosen in l as well, indifference in k implies that either
alternative b has to be chosen in l or that one has to be indifferent between the
alternatives of l.
Both fanning-out and fanning-in deal with a change in slope as one moves
to different indifference curves (at least when preferences satisfy monotonicity).
The research on extensions of EU theory has also focused on the relevancy of
the linearity of the indifference curves implied by expressions (1) and (2). Three
different assumptions have been proposed:
Betweenness. For any alternatives p and q and any scalar  ∈ (0,1), it holds
that p   q if and only if p   p + (1 − )q   q.
Quasi-convexity. For any alternatives p and q and any scalar  ∈ (0,1),
F(p + (1 − )q) ≤ max{F(p),F(q)}.
Quasi-concavity. For any alternatives p and q and any scalar  ∈ (0,1),
F(p + (1 − )q) ≥ min{F(p),F(q)}.
Betweenness obviously is an implication of independence. It implies that, if
p∼q, then for any scalar  ∈ (0,1) it holds that p∼p + (1 − )q∼q, which
means that indifference curves are straight lines – but not necessarily parallel. Be-
tweenness implies neutrality to mixtures of alternatives on the same indifference
curve. Straightforward extensions are concave indifference curves (corresponding
totheassumptionofquasi-convexity),describingmixtureaversion,andconvexin-
differencecurves(correspondingtotheassumptionofquasi-concavity),describing
mixture proneness. The latter case is illustrated in Fig. 3. Betweenness, quasi-
convexity and quasi-concavity have implications for the combinations of choice
pairs (1, 2), (5, 7), and (6, 8) in the ﬁgures. In each of those combinations, the only
responsepatternsconsistentwithbetweennessareaa,bband∼∼.Quasi-convexity
allows, in addition to the betweenness patterns, ab, a∼ and ∼b. Quasi-concavity,
on the other hand, allows, in addition to the betweenness patterns, ba, b∼ and ∼a.Social Welfare, the Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 93
Fig. 3. Quasi-concavity.
2.3. Rank-dependent Expected Utility and Yaari’s Dual Theory
The most popular alternative to the EU model, at least for economists (see, e.g.
Starmer, 2000), is Quiggin’s (1982) rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU)
model. Most popular within the income distribution literature is Yaari’s (1987)
dual theory, which is a special case of the RDEU model. We will ﬁrst summarize
Yaari’s model and then return to the more general RDEU approach.





where for any i  = n
w(pi,p1 +···+pi) = f(pi +···+pn) − f(pi+1 +···+pn),
w(pn,p1 +···+pn) = f(pn) and f :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is a strictly increasing and
continuous function for which f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1. Given the conditions on f,
preferences are monotonic. Strong risk aversion requires that f be strictly convex
(Yaari, 1987). Note that while in the EU approach a change in an income is evalu-
ated in function of the size of the income, in the Yaari approach it is evaluated as
a function of its rank position (deﬁned as p1 +···+pi for an income xi).94 KRISTOF BOSMANS AND ERIK SCHOKKAERT
For the alternatives in the triangle diagram, Yaari’s theory implies that
F(p) = [1 − f(1 − p1)]x1 + [f(1 − p1) − f(p3)]x2 + f(p3)x3, (4)














Again, indifference curves are positively sloped (since f  (p) > 0 for all p). If f is
strictly convex, the slope decreases as p1 increases, ceteris paribus, and also as
p3 increases, ceteris paribus. If p1 decreases and p3 increases, the slope does not
necessarily go up or down. This means that indifference curves strictly fan out
horizontally – that is, the slope becomes strictly higher moving horizontally west
in the triangle diagram – and strictly fan in vertically – that is, the slope becomes
strictlysmallermovingverticallynorthinthetrianglediagram.Movingdiagonally
northwest, however, the slope can go up or down. This pattern is illustrated in
Fig. 4. By consequence, for the choices in the ﬁgures, fanning-out has to hold for
combinations of the choice pairs 1, 3 and 6 (an horizontal move in the triangle),
while fanning-in has to hold for combinations of the choice pairs 1, 4 and 5 (a
vertical move). There are no implications concerning fanning-out or fanning-in
for combinations of choices 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8.
Fig. 4. RDEU (Yaari) Indifference Curves.Social Welfare, the Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 95
Another important property is that, whenever f is strictly convex, the slope of
an indifference curve decreases as one moves to the northeast. Therefore, under
the assumption of strong risk aversion, indifference curves are strictly concave
(preferences are strictly quasi-convex).






where for any i  = n
w(pi,p1 +···+pi) = f(pi +···+pn) − f(pi+1 +···+pn),
w(pn,p1 +···+pn) = f(pn), f :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is a strictly increasing and con-
tinuous function for which f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1 and u is a strictly increasing
function. Again the conditions required for monotonicity are satisﬁed. Strong risk
aversion requires that the function f be convex and that the function u be concave
and, furthermore, that either f be strictly convex or u be strictly concave or both
(Chew, Karni & Safra, 1987). When u is the identity function, the RDEU model
(6) reduces to the Yaari model. When f is the identity function, it reduces to the
EU model.
















less) the same properties as those of the Yaari model. That is, indifference curves
are concave, fan out horizontally and fan in vertically.
2.4. Evaluating Income Distributions
There is a close formal relationship between the literature on income distribution
and the theory of decision making under risk. With the Gini index as a prominent
exception, the most common inequality measures (including the Atkinson-Kolm
and the generalized entropy measures) can all be interpreted in a social welfare
framework formally equivalent to the EU model as given in expression (1). This
means that they can be interpreted as reﬂecting VOI-preferences, i.e. the prefer-
encesofarationalindividualbehindtheveilofignorance.10 Ofcourseonecanalso96 KRISTOF BOSMANS AND ERIK SCHOKKAERT
defend EU-type assumptions without explicitly referring to the idea of the veil of
ignorance. One then has to justify the independence condition for ISO preferences
directly on ethical grounds rather than as a requirement of rationality behind the
veil of ignorance.
A strong competitor of the Atkinson-Kolm and the generalized entropy mea-
sures is the class of generalized Gini indices. These are based on a social welfare
function of the form of the Yaari model (3) (or, at least, an important subclass
is) and therefore do not satisfy the independence condition. The most popular
social  welfare  function  of  the  form  (3)  is  the  S-Gini  social  welfare  function,
where f(p) = p with > 1(Donaldson & Weymark, 1980; Yitzhaki, 1983). The
parameter  can be seen as a measure for the degree of inequality aversion. Note
that the popular Gini index is based on the S-Gini social welfare function with
= 2. A few studies such as Ebert (1988) and more recently Chateauneuf (1996)
and Chateauneuf, Gajdos and Wilthien (2002), have considered the evident ex-
tension to the Yaari model which is to base the evaluation of income distributions
on the RDEU model.
The idea of strong risk aversion is interpreted within the income distribution lit-
eratureasthePigou-Daltontransferprinciple,i.e.thenotionthatarankpreserving
transfer from a rich to a poor person increases social welfare. As we have seen, the
transfer principle requires in the EU model that the function u be strictly concave.
This assumption does not affect the response patterns compatible with EU theory
for the choice pairs in the triangle diagram of Fig. 1, however. As can be seen
from expression (2) the restriction to linear parallel indifference curves does not
depend on the concavity of u and a test of this restriction can be seen as a direct
test of the independence assumption without any need to make assumptions about
risk aversion.
Ontheotherhand,imposingthetransferprinciplehasstrongerconsequencesfor
the Yaari and the RDEU models within the triangle. As we have seen, it requires,
for instance, in both cases that the indifference curves be strictly concave. Since
the transfer principle occupies such a dominant position in the income distribution
literature, we will use in the empirical part the terms Yaari model and RDEU
model for expressions (3) and (6), respectively, with the assumption of concave
indifference curves imposed.
However, we know from previous empirical work that the transfer principle
is violated consistently by respondents.11 Let us therefore deﬁne the weaker
principle of “weak inequality aversion”: given a ﬁxed population, it should always
hold that a completely equal income distribution is better than any unequal
income distribution with the same total income. This principle seems absolutely
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the transfer principle with an EU social welfare function, i.e. a social welfare
function satisfying independence, because such a welfare function will only
satisfy weak inequality aversion if it satisﬁes the transfer principle. However,
in the Yaari (and RDEU) framework, weak inequality aversion does not imply
the transfer principle. It has been shown (Chateauneuf, 1996) that the Yaari
social welfare function (3) satisﬁes weak inequality aversion if and only if
f(p) < p for all p ∈ (0,1). This condition is strictly weaker than strict convexity
(since f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1). The RDEU social welfare function satisﬁes weak
inequality aversion if f(p) ≤ p for all p ∈ (0,1) and u is concave, with at least
one of the conditions holding in its strict version.12 In our empirical work we will
consider these extensions as well and label them Yaari  and RDEU .
In the risk literature, forms of the RDEU weighting function f that do not
satisfy the condition relating to weak inequality aversion have been considered
and sometimes offer a better explanation of observed choice patterns (see, e.g.
Gonzalez & Wu, 1999). We do not consider these forms in our empirical analysis
because in our view it does not make sense to base the evaluation of income
distributions on a welfare function which does not even satisfy the principle of
weak inequality aversion.
3. THE SETTING OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
The  target  group  of  the  questionnaire  consisted  of  ﬁrst  year  business  students  of
the K.U.Leuven (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium), who had not yet been
exposed to any lectures on the evaluation of income distributions or on decision
making under risk. The questionnaires were distributed and ﬁlled in in the classroom,
after the teacher had given a short and non-suggestive oral introduction. The sur-
vey was organized twice (with different respondents in two subsequent academic
years):  in  April  2002  and  in  November  2002.  The  results  were  stable  over  time.  In
order  to  test  for  the  differences  between  ISO,  VOI  and  PIR  preferences,  there  were
three different versions of the questionnaire. Accordingly, the group of students
was divided into three subgroups. Each subgroup participated in only one version
of the questionnaire and respondents did not know that there were three different
versions. For the ISO version, the VOI version and the PIR version, there are 93,
92 and 94 respondents, respectively.
Each questionnaire version consists of the same eight questions, where in each
question,therespondentisaskedtomakeachoicebetweentwoalternatives,which
areeitherincomedistributionsorlotteries,dependingonthegivenchoicesituation.
The eight choice pairs correspond to the alternatives shown in Fig. 1 (with the98 KRISTOF BOSMANS AND ERIK SCHOKKAERT
probabilities as given in Table 1). Throughout the questionnaire, the same set of
three incomes X ={ x1 = d500, x2 = d1500, x3 = d2500} is used. In line with
the Allais problems described earlier, we refer to questions 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 as
the “common consequence questions,” and to questions 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 as the
“common ratio questions.”
Although the same choice pairs are used, the background stories are different
for the three versions of the questionnaire.13 Each of the three versions deals with
recently graduated students that are going to be employed in one of two ﬁrms.
Each ﬁrm offers three types of jobs which are identical in every respect except for
the income that is earned: the ﬁrst job pays d2500, the second d1500 and the third
d500.FortheISOandVOIversions,aﬁrmcorrespondstoanincomedistribution,
for the PIR version it corresponds to a lottery.
In the ISO version, the respondent is asked to consider the situation of 100
recently graduated students that will all be employed in either of two ﬁrms, which
are different only with respect to the number of positions that are available for
each of the jobs. The respondent is then asked to reveal, for the eight cases, which
of the two ﬁrms he or she thinks offers the largest social welfare.
The VOI version also asks the respondent to consider the situation of 100
recently graduated students, but this time the respondent has to picture himself or
herself as being one of them. Again, the ﬁrms are different only with respect to
the number of positions that are available for each of the jobs. The respondent and
the 99 other graduated students will all be employed in the same ﬁrm and each
has an equal chance of ending up in any of the 100 positions available in the ﬁrm.
The respondent is then asked to state, for each of the eight cases, which ﬁrm he or
she prefers.
In the PIR version, the respondent is asked to picture himself or herself as being
a recently graduated student who will be employed in either of two ﬁrms. The
ﬁrms are identical except with respect to the probabilities of ending up with each
ofthejobs.Therespondentisthen,again,askedtostate,foreachoftheeightcases,
which ﬁrm he or she prefers.
As mentioned already in the introduction, the setting of our questionnaire is
similar to the one used by Bernasconi (2002). There are three main differences,
however. First, we use different and more income distributions (and therefore test
someaxiomswhichcouldnotbetestedbyhim).Second,herepresentsthedifferent
income distributions in the questionnaires with pie charts, while we simply give
the relevant sets of numbers. Third, he formulates the ISO, VOI and PIR cases in
a more abstract form, while we tried to formulate a question which was closer to
the everyday experience of our respondents. The comparison of his results with
ours will therefore give some insight into the importance of framing effects (for
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4. RESULTS
Our discussion of the results focuses on the two general issues raised before: the
comparison of the ISO, VOI and PIR versions of the questionnaire, and the degree
of consistency with the preference theories presented in Section 2.I nSection 4.1,
we have a ﬁrst look at the question of how the three versions of the questionnaire
compare through an analysis of the responses for separate questions. Combining
theanswersondifferentquestionsmakesitpossibletotestalsotherelevancyofthe
different basic axioms of choice theory (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3, we conclude
the discussion by focusing on the different theories which have been proposed in
the income distribution literature.
4.1. A First Look
Table 2 and Fig. 5 give the results for the separate questions. The chi-square test
statistics reported in Table 3 test for each question separately the null hypothesis
that population proportions for categories a and b, respectively, are equal for the
two versions under comparison (ISO-VOI, VOI-PIR or ISO-PIR) (there is one
degree of freedom).14 To some extent Table 3 suggests that the results for the ISO
and PIR versions are furthest removed from each other while the results for the
VOI version lie in between. This is exactly what one would expect a priori: ISO
preferences deal exclusively with uninvolved common interest, PIR preferences
dealexclusivelywithinvolvedselfinterestandVOIpreferencesdealwithinvolved
common interest (that is, the common interest is at stake). We will see that this
pattern is conﬁrmed in more detailed analyses.
Table 2 shows that, overall, alternative b is more popular than the other two
alternatives. In the risk literature b alternatives are usually seen as more risky
Table 2. Results for Separate Questions (in %).
Question ISO VOI PIR
ab ∼ ab ∼ ab ∼
1 3 75 942 67 222 76 94
2 5 04 554 55 145 84 30
3 3 06 642 07 731 77 85
4 6 13 723 85 752 86 93
5 4 45 512 96 733 56 23
6 1 97 641 68 223 56 32
7 5 64 224 15 355 14 36
8 3 06 193 66 044 84 58100 KRISTOF BOSMANS AND ERIK SCHOKKAERT
Fig. 5. Overview of the Results, b Responses (in %).
than the corresponding a alternatives. Analogously, we could say that they are
more unequal in the income distribution context. The popularity of the b answers
can be explained by the choice of the set of incomes in our questionnaire design.
Consider as a benchmark the case of a respondent who has preferences consistent
with the Atkinson social welfare function: for the given income amounts, such a
Table 3. Chi-square Tests for Homogeneity for Separate Questions.
Question ISO-VOI VOI-PIR ISO-PIR
1 2.72 (0.099) 0.03 (0.867) 2.20 (0.138)
2 0.57 (0.451) 2.15 (0.143) 0.49 (0.483)
3 2.93 (0.087) 0.15 (0.703) 4.35 (0.037)
4 8.94 (0.003) 2.68 (0.101) 21.29 (0.000)
5 3.91 (0.048) 0.71 (0.399) 1.31 (0.253)
6 0.38 (0.539) 8.64 (0.003) 5.47 (0.019)
7 3.23 (0.073) 2.07 (0.151) 0.12 (0.726)
8 0.39 (0.530) 3.58 (0.058) 6.21 (0.013)
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respondent only prefers a over b if she has a relatively high value of 2.5 or more
for the parameter of inequality aversion.
4.2. Testing Some Concrete Hypotheses of Choice Theory
More interesting insights can be gained by analysing the response patterns for
different choice pairs together. We will ﬁrst look at combinations of two questions
and then analyse the overall response patterns for the eight questions. We focus,
again, on the two main issues. In the ﬁrst place, we test the empirical relevancy
of the concrete hypotheses of choice theory. In the second place, we check for the
possible differences between ISO, VOI and PIR preferences.
4.2.1. Pairs of Questions
(a) Tables 4 and 5 show the results for combinations of several pairs of common
consequence questions and common ratio questions, respectively. For each
Table 4. Results for Pairs of Common Consequence Questions (in %).
Questions Version EU Fanning-out Fanning-in
(aa, bb, ∼∼)( ba, b∼, ∼a)( ab, a∼, ∼b)
3, 1 ISO 61 23 (0.203) 16
VOI 63 22 (0.196) 15
PIR 63 23 (0.088) 14
1, 4 ISO 53 35 (0.001) 12
VOI 60 26 (0.049) 14
PIR 55 22 (0.562) 22
3, 6 ISO 61 14 25 (0.066)
VOI 73 12 15 (0.345)
PIR 62 27 (0.014) 12
6, 1 ISO 55 31 (0.010) 14
VOI 67 22 (0.049) 11
PIR 63 14 23 (0.088)
1, 5 ISO 67 19 (0.237) 14
VOI 72 16 (0.279) 12
PIR 66 21 (0.108) 13
5, 4 ISO 62 28 (0.003) 10
VOI 54 27 (0.140) 18
PIR 63 15 22 (0.155)
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Table 5. Results for Pairs of Common Ratio Questions (in %).
Questions Version EU Fanning-out Fanning-in
(aa, bb, ∼∼)( ba, b∼, ∼a)( ab, a∼, ∼b)
3, 2 ISO 55 33 (0.001) 12
VOI 57 36 (0.000) 8
PIR 51 45 (0.000) 4
2, 4 ISO 56 27 (0.106) 17
VOI 62 15 23 (0.155)
PIR 57 6 36 (0.000)
3, 8 ISO 62 20 (0.368) 17
VOI 60 29 (0.004) 11
PIR 53 41 (0.000) 5
8, 2 ISO 61 29 (0.002) 10
VOI 52 29 (0.087) 18
PIR 64 21 (0.196) 15
2, 7 ISO 68 17 (0.428) 15
VOI 62 17 21 (0.368)
PIR 67 16 17 (0.500)
7, 4 ISO 60 23 (0.256) 17
VOI 62 17 21 (0.368)
PIR 56 9 35 (0.000)
Note: p-Values between brackets.
combination of two choice pairs (described in the ﬁrst column) we give separately
the results for the three versions of the questionnaire. As shown in Section 2.1,
only three of the nine possible response patterns are consistent with EU theory
for each of the combinations of two questions included in Tables 4 and 5: the
respondent can prefer a in both choice pairs, she can prefer b in both pairs or
she can be indifferent (∼) in both choice situations. We call these patterns, (aa,
bb, ∼∼), therefore “EU consistent” and the percentage of respondents with one
of these three response patterns is given in the third column of Tables 4 and 5.
Analogously we can say that the response patterns (ba, b∼, ∼a) and (ab, a∼,
∼b) are consistent with indifference curves that fan out and fan in, respectively. In
both cases, we exclude EU consistent patterns from the categories fanning-out and
fanning-in. The percentages of respondents with these patterns are given in the
last two columns of the tables.
Clearly, EU consistent responses dominate. One should be aware that this does
not necessarily imply that our respondents follow the axioms of EU theory, as it is
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but not over three or more. We will return to this issue in the next section. At this
stageitismoreinterestingtoconsiderwhethertheviolationsofEUtheoryforeach
of the question pairs are systematic, that is, whether the percentage of observed
patterns consistent with fanning-out (or fanning-in) is signiﬁcantly higher than
the percentage that would be observed if the response patterns of the respondents
that violate EU theory were completely random. The null hypothesis is that the
population frequency of fanning-out (or fanning-in) violations relative to the total
population frequency of violations is equal to 50%. The tables report p-values for
the one sided exact test based on the binomial distribution.
The ﬁrst combinations of choice pairs in Tables 4 and 5, the combinations
(3, 1) and (3, 2), are of particular interest, as they are similar to the original
examples used by Allais for introducing the common consequence and common
ratioeffects,respectively.Inbothcasesthepredictedfanning-outpatternsaremore
popular than the fanning-in patterns. The statistical signiﬁcancy of fanning-out is
much weaker for Allais’ common consequence effect (questions 3 and 1) than for
Allais’ common ratio effect (questions 3 and 2).
The overall picture shows some interesting differences between the ISO,
VOI and PIR versions of the questionnaire. A mixed pattern of fanning-out and
fanning-in is observed in the PIR version. This is in line with the experimental
research on decision making under risk. However, with only one exception,
fanning-out is always dominating in the ISO version. The VOI version is between
theothertwo,butwitharelativelystrongpresenceoffanning-out.Table6presents
the chi-square test statistics for the hypothesis of homogeneity of two versions
with respect to the categories EU, fanning-out and fanning-in between versions
Table 6. Chi-square Tests for Homogeneity for Pairs of Questions.
Questions ISO-VOI VOI-PIR ISO-PIR
3,  1  0.06  (0.969)  0.12  (0.942)  0.20  (0.907)
1, 4 1.93 (0.381) 2.15 (0.342) 5.88 (0.053)
3, 6 3.16 (0.206) 6.43 (0.040) 8.03 (0.018)
6, 1 3.11 (0.211) 6.04 (0.049) 8.99 (0.011)
1, 5 0.56 (0.756) 0.86 (0.650) 0.14 (0.932)
5,  4  3.07  (0.216)  4.25  (0.120)  8.40  (0.015)
3, 2 0.96 (0.620) 2.04 (0.361) 5.01 (0.082)
2, 4 4.00 (0.135) 6.33 (0.042) 18.16 (0.000)
3, 8 2.85 (0.241) 4.07 (0.131) 13.25 (0.001)
8, 2 3.23 (0.199) 2.65 (0.267) 2.20 (0.333)
2, 7 1.05 (0.591) 0.57 (0.753) 0.16 (0.923)
7,  4  0.94  (0.626)  6.56  (0.038)  11.80  (0.003)
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(there are two degrees of freedom).15 The hypothesis formulated on the basis
of Table 3 is corroborated by the results in Table 6: the results for the ISO and
PIR versions form the extremes while the results for the VOI version are situated
in between.
The question pairs in Table 4 also allow to test for some aspects of the Yaari and
RDEU models (with the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle imposed). As we have
seen (Section 2.3), these models imply that fanning-out holds horizontally, that is,
for the question pairs (3, 1), (3, 6) and (6, 1), while fanning-in holds vertically, and
thus for the question pairs (1, 4), (1, 5) and (5, 4) (of course, the EU patterns for
these pairs are also consistent with the models). This pattern is not supported by
the results for the ISO and VOI versions, especially where the Yaari and RDEU
models imply fanning-in.
(b) Table 7 gives the results for the question pairs (6,8), (1,2) and (5,7). These
combinations allow to test betweenness, i.e. the linearity of indifference curves
(which is EU consistent) against quasi-convexity (excluding EU consistent
patterns) and quasi-concavity (again, excluding EU consistent patterns). The
corresponding response patterns have already been described in Section 2.2.
The results in Table 7 are striking. There is a clear and signiﬁcant domination
of quasi-concavity, i.e. convex indifference curves. This mixture proneness is
found in all three versions of the questionnaire.16 Quasi-concavity has also been
found in experimental work on decision making under risk (see, e.g. Camerer
& Ho, 1994). Its implications for welfare analysis, however, are important. We
mentioned already that imposition of the transfer principle in the Yaari and RDEU
models implies quasi-convex preferences. We will return to the implications of
these ﬁndings in Section 4.3.
Table 7. Results for Pairs of Questions (in %).
Questions  Version  EU  Quasi-convexity   Quasi-concavity
(aa, bb, ∼∼)( ab, a∼, ∼b)( ba, b∼, ∼a)
6, 8 ISO 57 15 28 (0.040)
VOI 61 9 30 (0.001)
PIR 54 14 32 (0.007)
1, 2 ISO 70 8 23 (0.006)
VOI 61 9 30 (0.001)
PIR 55 7 37 (0.000)
5, 7 ISO 63 13 24 (0.061)
VOI 57 14 29 (0.019)
PIR 53 14 33 (0.005)
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Table 8. Results for the Combination of All Eight Questions (in %).
EU  Fanning-out  Fanning-in  Betweenness      Quasi-convexity     Quasi-concavity
Reference 0.8 6.3 6.3 12.5 42.2 42.2
ISO 10 30 13 32 46 68
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.246) (0.000)
Test 2 (0.000) (0.889) (0.002) (0.854) (0.001)
VOI 13 29 18 26 40 70
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.686) (0.000)
Test 2 (0.000) (0.570) (0.393) (0.998) (0.003)
PIR 11 24 15 21 37 72
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.012) (0.859) (0.000)
Test 2 (0.002) (0.762) (0.675) (0.999) (0.000)
Note: p-Values between brackets.
4.2.2. The Total Pattern of Answers
In Table 8, we summarize the results for a more ambitious approach in which
the eight questions are considered jointly. Each column refers to a speciﬁc hy-
pothesis of choice theory. We ﬁrst give, for each hypothesis, as a reference point
the proportion of the 256 (= 28) possible patterns that is actually consistent with
the given hypothesis.17 If individual response patterns were completely random,
we would expect to ﬁnd the “reference” degree of support for the various hypothe-
ses. We then test whether the actual number of consistent response patterns in the
data is signiﬁcantly larger than what would be expected for random responses.18
This test is labelled “Test 1” in Table 8.
For all three versions, all hypotheses except quasi-convexity pass Test 1. Note
that about 10–13% of the observed patterns are consistent with EU theory – which
is signiﬁcantly more than the 0.8% which would be found with a completely
randomresponsepattern.AnexplanationofthesuccessofEUtheorycouldbethat
respondents use the expected value rule. At the same time it should be mentioned
that 10–13% is far from overwhelming considering the focal role of EU theory in
the  risk  and  in  the  income  distribution  literature.
Since all the other hypotheses generalize EU theory, they all beneﬁt from the
relatively good performance of that theory. It is more revealing therefore to test
whether they “add” something to EU theory. We do this by removing from the
sampleallEUconsistentpatterns.Fortheremaining(non-EUconsistent)responses
we follow an analogous procedure as described before. For each hypothesis (each
column) we ﬁrst compute, with respect to the set of all possible patterns excluding
the EU consistent patterns, the proportion of consistent responses to be expected
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the proportion of consistent responses in the (reduced) sample is signiﬁcantly
larger than what would be expected in the random case. The resulting p-values are
summarized in Table 8 under the label “Test 2.”19
For all three versions, fanning-out adds signiﬁcantly to EU theory, while the
fanning-in hypothesis does not. Looking at the shape of the indifference curves,
betweenness adds explanatory power to EU theory for the ISO version, but not for
the other versions. An approach with linear but non-parallel indifference curves
in the Marschak-Machina triangle seems to have some relevance to describe the
preferencesofanimpartialandsympatheticobserver.However,morestrikingisthe
signiﬁcance of quasi-concavity for all three versions. The global response patterns
therefore conﬁrm what we found already by analysing the combinations of choice
pairs two by two.
4.3. The Fate of Different Theories of
Income Distribution Evaluation
The importance of quasi-concavity and fanning-out already suggests that the most
popular approaches in the income distribution literature will not get much support
in our data. Table 9, which is constructed in a similar way as Table 8, summarizes
the results in a more structured way. We repeat the results for the EU model as
a benchmark. Remember that the EU approach performs signiﬁcantly better than
what would be predicted if the answers were random. As shown by the results for
“Test  1,”  the  same  is  true  for  the  S-Gini,  the  Yaari,  the  RDEU,  the  Yaari’  and  the
RDEU’ models (for the latter three only in the VOI and PIR versions).
Table 9. Results for the Combination of All Eight Questions (in %).
EU S-Gini Yaari RDEU Yaari’ RDEU’
Reference 0.8 2.7 15.2 16.4 65.6 79.3
ISO 10 13 23 23 69 78
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.075) (0.298) (0.633)
Test 2 (0.273) (0.708) (0.805) (0.895) (0.990)
V O I 1 31 62 52 57 88 8
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.023) (0.006) (0.021)
Test 2 (0.268) (0.794) (0.869) (0.518) (0.829)
PIR 11 15 26 26 74 90
Test 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.016) (0.042) (0.003)
Test 2 (0.113) (0.496) (0.621) (0.627) (0.440)
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However, in our set-up all these alternative theories are less restrictive than
EU theory. In fact, each of them can also rationalize each pattern that is EU
consistent.20 We therefore want to test whether any of these theories adds some
explanatory power to the EU model. Analogously to the previous section, we
therefore computed again the “Test 2” results. For none of the versions, Yaari’s
theory or the (more restricted) S-Gini model passes this stricter test. Nor does the
RDEU model. To repeat: this implies that the proportion of observed response
patterns in the subsample of non-EU consistent responses which is consistent with
thesemodelsisnotsigniﬁcantlylargerthanwhatwouldbeexpectediftheanswers
of the respondents were completely random. It is important to remember that we
imposed the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in the Yaari and the RDEU-model,
i.e. convexity of the weighting function f, and that our results can only be seen
as a test of this restricted model. Yet relaxation of this convexity condition does
not seem to help very much, given the fate of the Yaari’ and the RDEU’ models,
which only impose the property of weak inequality aversion. It is difﬁcult to see
how one could construct an attractive egalitarian theory of social welfare which
does not satisfy this very weak property. Both models (Yaari’ and RDEU’) are
quite ﬂexible and it is therefore not surprising that the proportion of response
patterns compatible with them is very high. Again, however, the models do not
add signiﬁcantly to EU, in the sense that randomly chosen patterns would have
performed equally well.
These results seem to suggest that it is worthwhile to work out alternatives for
the EU-type social welfare functions, i.e. to try and elaborate an alternative which
does not embody the independence assumption. At the same time, however, the
Yaari- and RDEU-type extensions with weak inequality aversion imposed do not
seem to be very promising, at least when one wants to rationalize the preferences
of our respondents (and they appear to be even less successful for the ISO than
for the VOI or PIR version). Comparing Tables 8 and 9 it is striking how much
better is the performance of other alternatives to the EU model like fanning-out
and quasi-concavity. It remains to be seen whether these ideas can be integrated
in an attractive theory of income distribution.
5. CONCLUSION
With our questionnaire study we wanted to test whether the veil of ignorance
approach captures in an adequate way the preferences of an impartial and
sympathetic observer. Moreover, we wanted to check whether the answers of our
respondents satisfy the independence axiom – underlying EU theory and most
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questions are related but different. One can accept the VOI approach and at the
same time argue in favour of a non-EU model behind the veil of ignorance. And
one can defend the independence assumption for inequality measurement without
the detour of the veil of ignorance.
As to the ﬁrst question, the results for the three questionnaire versions
(ISO, VOI and PIR) are to a certain degree similar: both of Allais’ problems
are present, there is quite a lot of systematic fanning-out or fanning-in, and
quasi-concavity is an important systematic violation of EU (or betweenness).
However, there are differences and it appears that the ISO and PIR versions are
at both extremes. The identiﬁcation of ISO preferences with VOI preferences is
not evident. Note that the results for the PIR version are reassuringly comparable
to the results encountered in empirical studies from the literature on decision
under risk: Allais’ problems, a complex fanning pattern, systematic violations
of betweenness.
The EU model yields a signiﬁcant contribution to the explanation of the
response patterns. At the same time, however, there are clear indications of the
relevancyoffanning-outandquasi-concavity,alsointheISOversion.Fanning-out
and quasi-concavity do not characterize the most popular alternatives to the EU
model – the RDEU model with as a special case the Yaari model, which provides
the normative basis for an important subclass of the family of generalized Ginis.
It is therefore not surprising that they do not add much explanatory power.
These are the results of only one limited study. However, they are in the line of
muchpreviousresearchontheempiricalacceptanceofthemostpopularinequality
axioms. Moreover, despite the differences in the concrete formulation of the ques-
tionnaires and in the general set-up of the empirical study, some of our results are
strikingly similar to those of Bernasconi (2002): he also ﬁnds that the equivalence
of VOI and ISO preferences cannot be taken for granted and that quasi-concavity,
i.e. mixture proneness, is important to explain the empirical results.
The conclusion that the traditional inequality literature does not adequately
capture the intuitions of our respondents seems clear. Even if we take the Yaari
and the EU model together only a quarter of our students shows a response pattern
which is in line with one of them. Of course, one can reasonably argue that the
normative relevancy of this kind of questionnaire results is limited, as they can
never substitute for critical reﬂection and thorough assessment of the ethical
argumentation. We do not go into that debate here. However, a conditional con-
clusion seems possible. If one wants to construct a theory of income distribution
which is more attuned to the intuitions of lay respondents, the RDEU model with
imposition of weak inequality aversion does not seem to be the most promising
starting point.Social Welfare, the Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 109
NOTES
1. Similar approaches have been proposed by Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Rawls (1958,
1971). The latter coined the term “veil of ignorance.” Harsanyi used the approach to justify
(mean) utilitarianism while Rawls used it to justify his deontological theory which couples
a respect for basic liberties with maximin in “primary goods.”
2. Harsanyi’s claim that mean utilitarianism follows from his assumptions has been
criticized on several accounts. See Mongin (2001) for a thorough overview of the literature.
3. See Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001) for recent overviews of this literature.
4. For overviews, see Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000).
5. To be precise, we are referring to the subclass that satisﬁes Dalton’s Population
Principle. See, for instance, Gajdos (2001) for details.
6. The most inﬂuential work is by Amiel and Cowell, who summarize their
most important ﬁndings in Amiel and Cowell (1999). See also Harrison and Seidl
(1994a, b).
7. This graphical device was introduced into the literature by Marschak (1950) and
popularizedbyMachina(1982).Ithassincebeenusedinmanyempiricalstudiesconcerning
individual decision under risk.
8. Ofcourse,theslopeisnotrequiredtobeequalacrossdifferenttriangles,whendifferent
sets X are considered.
9. Indeed,Machina(1982)hasshownthattheslopeoftheEUmodel,giveninexpression
(2), is related to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion.
10. Dahlby (1987) explicitly works out this interpretation.
11. This is found especially in the context of inequality comparisons (see for instance
Amiel & Cowell, 1992, 1998; Ballano & Ruiz-Castillo, 1993; Harrison & Seidl, 1994a, b),
but also in the context of social welfare comparisons (Amiel & Cowell, 1994).
12. In fact, Chateauneuf (1996) has shown that these conditions for the Yaari and RDEU
models imply consistency with the “absolute differentials ordering,” which is a stronger
requirementthantheoneofweakinequalityaversion.Thisstrongerprinciplecanbeformu-
lated as follows. Suppose that we have two income distributions with the same population
and total income, and in the ﬁrst income distribution the absolute income difference for
each income pair is greater than, or equally great as, in the second distribution while for
at least one pair the absolute income difference is greater, then the ﬁrst income distribu-
tion is more unequal than the second. It seems natural to extend the principle to the social
welfare context by stating that the second income distribution should be evaluated as better
than the ﬁrst.
13. The precise formulation of the background stories in each of the versions is given in
Appendix A. For each background story there were two variants of the questionnaire with
the questions ordered differently. Since the results show that there is only a slight indication
of order effects, we simply pooled the answers for these different variants.
14. We ignore the category of indifference (∼) in the tests because it usually has
frequencies lower than ﬁve, which would make the chi-square test less appropriate.
15. Note the difference with Table 3, in which we tested for homogeneity of the three
versions with respect to the responses (a or b) for the eight separate questions. Table 6 tests
for homogeneity of the three versions with respect to response patterns (EU consistent,
fanning-out or fanning-in) for combinations of two questions.110 KRISTOF BOSMANS AND ERIK SCHOKKAERT
16. Chi-square tests show that the null hypothesis of homogeneity over the versions
cannot be rejected.
17. For convenience, we have neglected patterns with indifferences. There are only very
few cases of indifference in the answers of our respondents.
18. Morespeciﬁcally,wetestthenullhypothesisthatthepopulationproportioninsupport
of the given hypothesis of choice theory is equal to the population proportion in support of
the same hypothesis if choices were completely random against the alternative hypothesis
that it is greater.
19. More speciﬁcally, “Test 2” considers the null hypothesis that the population propor-
tion in support of a speciﬁc non-EU hypothesis, excluding the part of the population that
is in support of EU theory as well, is equal to what would be the population proportion in
support of that non-EU hypothesis, excluding the part of the population that is in support
of EU theory as well, if choices were random. The alternative hypothesis is that the former
population proportion is greater than the latter.
20. This is not a general property – but it holds for our set of speciﬁc questions within
the Marschak-Machina triangle.
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APPENDIX A.1: ISO VERSION
Considerthesituationoftwoﬁrms,AandB,thateachplantoemploy100recently
graduated students. Assume that in each ﬁrm there are three types of jobs that are
identicalinallrespectsbutyieldadifferentmonthlynetincome.Theﬁrstjobyields
d2500,thesecondd1500andthethirdd500.Theﬁrmsdifferhoweverwithrespect
to the numbers of positions they have available for each of the three jobs.
Evidently, due to the different distribution of incomes, the global welfare of the
100 employees can be different in the ﬁrms A and B. We are interested in your
personal judgement of these welfare differences.
Indicate in each of the eight questions below which ﬁrm leads to the highest
welfare according to you by marking A or B. So, the marked letter corresponds
to the ﬁrm that you prefer from a welfare perspective. If you consider both ﬁrms
to be equally good, then mark both letters. Of course each question needs to be
treated separately and a different answer can be given in each case.
A: B:
Question 1 100 earn d1500 each 20 earn d2500 each
75 earn d1500 each
5 earn d500 each
Question 2 100 earn d1500 each 80 earn d2500 each
20 earn d500 each
Question 3 25 earn d1500 each 20 earn d2500 each
75 earn d500 each 80 earn d500each
Question 4 75 earn d2500 each 95 earn d2500 each
25 earn d1500 each 5 earn d500 eachSocial Welfare, the Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 113
Question 5 20 earn d2500 each 40 earn d2500 each
80 earn d1500 each 55 earn d1500 each
5 earn d500 each
Question 6 80 earn d1500 each 20 earn d2500 each
20 earn d500 each 55 earn d1500 each
25 earn d500 each
Question 7 20 earn d2500 each 84 earn d2500 each
80 earn d1500 each 16 earn d500 each
Question 8 80 earn d1500 each 64 earn d2500 each
20 earn d500 each 36 earn d500 each
APPENDIX A.2: VOI VERSION
Try to put yourself in the position of a recently graduated student who has to
choose, just as 99 other recently graduated students, between accepting a job in
ﬁrm A or in ﬁrm B. Assume that in each ﬁrm there are three types of jobs that
are identical in all respects but yield a different monthly net income. The ﬁrst job
yieldsd2500,thesecondd1500andthethirdd500.Theﬁrmsdifferhoweverwith
respect to the numbers of positions they have available for each of the three jobs.
You and the 99 other recently graduated students either all end up in ﬁrm A or
all in ﬁrm B. Each of the 100 of you has an equal probability of ending up in each
of the 100 positions. So, it is unknown beforehand which job you will get.
Indicate in each of the eight questions below which ﬁrm you would prefer by
marking A or B. So, the marked letter corresponds to the ﬁrm that would be
preferred by you in this situation. If you consider both ﬁrms to be equally good,
then mark both letters. Of course each question needs to be treated separately and
a different answer can be given in each case.
Note. The formulation of the questions is identical to that of the ISO version in
Appendix A.1. The questions are therefore omitted.
APPENDIX A.3: PIR VERSION
Trytoputyourselfinthepositionofarecentlygraduatedstudentwhohastochoose
between accepting a job in ﬁrm A or in ﬁrm B. Assume that in each ﬁrm there are114 KRISTOF BOSMANS AND ERIK SCHOKKAERT
three types of jobs that are identical in all respects but yield a different monthly
net income. The ﬁrst job yields d2500, the second d1500 and the third d500. The
ﬁrms differ however with respect to the numbers of positions they have available
for each of the three jobs. Beforehand it is not known with certainty which of the
threepossiblejobsyouwilleventuallyget.Yourchancesaredifferentinbothﬁrms.
Indicate in each of the eight questions below which ﬁrm you would prefer by
marking A or B. So, the marked letter corresponds to the ﬁrm that would be
preferred by you in this situation. If you consider both ﬁrms to be equally good,
then mark both letters. Of course each question needs to be treated separately and
a different answer can be given in each case.
A: B:
Question 1 100% chance that you earn d1500 20% chance that you earn d2500
75% chance that you earn d1500
5% chance that you earn d500
Question 2 100% chance that you earn d1500 80% chance that you earn d2500
20% chance that you earn d500
Question 3 25% chance that you earn d1500 20% chance that you earn d2500
75% chance that you earn d500 80% chance that you earn d500
Question 4 75% chance that you earn d2500 95% chance that you earn d2500
25% chance that you earn d1500 5% chance that you earn d500
Question 5 20% chance that you earn d2500 40% chance that you earn d2500
80% chance that you earn d1500 55% chance that you earn d1500
5% chance that you earn d500
Question 6 80% chance that you earn d1500 20% chance that you earn d2500
20% chance that you earn d500 55% chance that you earn d1500
25% chance that you earn d500
Question 7 20% chance that you earn d2500 84% chance that you earn d2500
80% chance that you earn d1500 16% chance that you earn d500
Question 8 80% chance that you earn d1500 64% chance that you earn d2500
20% chance that you earn d500 36% chance that you earn d500